Today, I would like to talk to you about three norms: the first involves seating arrangements on public transportation, the second involves elevators, and the third is the walking rule.
There is a certain, very specific etiquette involved when one rides public transportation. For obvious reasons, the elderly, disabled, pregnant women, and children are always given preferential treatment when it comes to seating. Most public transportation systems have seats reserved for the elderly and handicapped, usually right next to the bus or train car doors so that people who are not as mobile are easily able to find seats and don't have to maneuver all over a usually moving platform. I violate this rule, I admit, by frequently sitting in these semi-reserved seats. If I don't, some other perfectly healthy individual will do so. However, as soon as someone who doesn't appear to have the ability to stand in a moving bus enters, I give up my seat. Partially, this is because it seems profoundly wrong to let an old lady stand for five stops. Part of it, however, proves the effectiveness of shame. I would be embarassed if a pregnant woman was standing and I had a seat to give her, and chose not to do so. I glare at other people who behave like this, so I assume other people feel the same way.
The second norm that I would like to discuss is always interesting. It involves elevator etiquette. When one person enters an elevator, he or she may stand wherever they please. Once a second person enters, both people move to opposite sides of the elevator. A third person will stand in the middle. A fourth will take the place of the third one, who moves to the back and usually to one side. The fifth person to enter will take the fourth person's spot, who will move to the opposite corner from the third person. If any more people enter, there is a free-for-all, in which all persons simply try to avoid touching each other. There is no talking on an elevator, unless you know the people you are riding with. There is also a very serious attempt by all parties to avoid making eye contact, or to appear to be really looking at anyone else (unless, of course, you happen to be female, in which case it is perfectly acceptable to check out each other's shoes. Any other articles of clothing must be looked at in a very casual, quick-glance sort of way). People violating any or all of these rules will be seen as creepy, though, with the exception of groping and stealing, there really is no moral issue at stake.
My third norm is what I have called the walking rule. It is quite amazing to me that when walking, people unconsciously imitate driving. If a person is in a country where the inhabitants drive on the right side of the road, that person will walk on the right side of a sidewalk or hallway. If, however, that person lives in a place where everyone drives on the left, he or she will walk on the left. There is no real moral reason for this, other than the fact that once a pattern is established, it is best for you to follow it, in order to avoid knocking other people over. However, there is no law establishing that just because Americans drive on the right side of the road, they must walk down the right side of the hallway, while the British and Australians should walk on the left.
Wednesday, January 30, 2008
Monday, January 21, 2008
Three Kings
Here is a list of my observations regarding the movie Three Kings.
For starters, the whole movie is predicated on a violation of IHL, which is the no pillaging rule. First, the Iraqis pillaged from Kuwait, and then the Americans pillaged from the Iraqis, though I'm not sure to what extent they were pillaging given that the goods were stolen in the first place. Anyway, I find this rule to be rather dull, because then piracy is illegal, which would invalidate all those fun pirate jokes, and then what would be the point of LIVING?
Anyway. The first scene in the entire movie actually prompted an argument between my boyfriend and me over what exactly happened and whether it constituted a violation of IHL or not. We actually watched the scene at least three times, and I'm still ambivalent. The scene I'm referring to is the one in which Mark Wahlberg shoots an Iraqi who appears to be waving something, but at the same time rotates in position and also appears to be turning his gun to face the Americans. When the Americans see the dead man up close, it becomes apparent that he was waving a white flag. However, he pretty clearly was turning, with his gun pointed at Mark Wahlberg. In other words, I have no idea what happened. Was he actually surrendering, or using the white flag as a trick to kill the Americans? I suspect that, either way, Mark Wahlberg's character would not have been prosecuted, as the situation was rather ambiguous, and he certainly was acting in self-defense. IHL requires that soldiers who are captured are not harmed in any way. In that vein, there were several instances of mistreatment of captured soldiers. There was, of course, torture. Obviously, torture is not allowed. Ever. Civilian or otherwise. Torture brings me to my second ambiguity regarding this movie. My boyfriend asked if the Americans were allowed to force the Iraqis to strip naked when they surrendered, and I said I was pretty sure they were allowed to do it, as long as it wasn't in a degrading manner. If it can be done in a non-degrading manner. It seems that the Americans had a right to be sure that none of the surrendering soldiers had, for example, secret maps stashed in their colons. Or bombs strapped under their uniforms. I'm not sure, however, whether it was technically legal because prisoners of war are guaranteed their dignity.
A very clear violation of IHL (and therefore a blessed respite from all this grey area) was the use of landmines, because they cannot distinguish between civilian and soldier, and therefore violate the principle of discrimination.
My final observation, and yet ANOTHER ambiguous moment for me, is in regards to the Iraqi army's suppression of the uprising. Certainly a sovereign state has the right to suppress an armed uprising by its citizens (though I would posit that if said state were appropriately democratic, the likelihood of their being an uprising worth speaking of would substantially decrease). However, as in Vietnam, and again in the Second Iraq War, how can one tell who the rebels are when they don't wear uniforms? I rather suspect this distinction would not have been made anyway in the case of the Republican Guard, but the question is still there. It is within the law for a state's military to fight rebels with military force. When the rebels come from a local population, however, and do not distinguish themselves from that population, how can the state's army avoid committing war crimes?
A specific instance of the soldiers obeying a norm that is not codified in international law was protecting civilian IDPs to get them to the Iranian border. IHL is ambigious when it comes to IDPs, and so there was no legal obligation for the Americans to protect them. This is especially significant in regards to the fact that in escorting the IDPs to the border, the Americans were directly violating international law by violating a treaty signed between the United States and Iraq.
For starters, the whole movie is predicated on a violation of IHL, which is the no pillaging rule. First, the Iraqis pillaged from Kuwait, and then the Americans pillaged from the Iraqis, though I'm not sure to what extent they were pillaging given that the goods were stolen in the first place. Anyway, I find this rule to be rather dull, because then piracy is illegal, which would invalidate all those fun pirate jokes, and then what would be the point of LIVING?
Anyway. The first scene in the entire movie actually prompted an argument between my boyfriend and me over what exactly happened and whether it constituted a violation of IHL or not. We actually watched the scene at least three times, and I'm still ambivalent. The scene I'm referring to is the one in which Mark Wahlberg shoots an Iraqi who appears to be waving something, but at the same time rotates in position and also appears to be turning his gun to face the Americans. When the Americans see the dead man up close, it becomes apparent that he was waving a white flag. However, he pretty clearly was turning, with his gun pointed at Mark Wahlberg. In other words, I have no idea what happened. Was he actually surrendering, or using the white flag as a trick to kill the Americans? I suspect that, either way, Mark Wahlberg's character would not have been prosecuted, as the situation was rather ambiguous, and he certainly was acting in self-defense. IHL requires that soldiers who are captured are not harmed in any way. In that vein, there were several instances of mistreatment of captured soldiers. There was, of course, torture. Obviously, torture is not allowed. Ever. Civilian or otherwise. Torture brings me to my second ambiguity regarding this movie. My boyfriend asked if the Americans were allowed to force the Iraqis to strip naked when they surrendered, and I said I was pretty sure they were allowed to do it, as long as it wasn't in a degrading manner. If it can be done in a non-degrading manner. It seems that the Americans had a right to be sure that none of the surrendering soldiers had, for example, secret maps stashed in their colons. Or bombs strapped under their uniforms. I'm not sure, however, whether it was technically legal because prisoners of war are guaranteed their dignity.
A very clear violation of IHL (and therefore a blessed respite from all this grey area) was the use of landmines, because they cannot distinguish between civilian and soldier, and therefore violate the principle of discrimination.
My final observation, and yet ANOTHER ambiguous moment for me, is in regards to the Iraqi army's suppression of the uprising. Certainly a sovereign state has the right to suppress an armed uprising by its citizens (though I would posit that if said state were appropriately democratic, the likelihood of their being an uprising worth speaking of would substantially decrease). However, as in Vietnam, and again in the Second Iraq War, how can one tell who the rebels are when they don't wear uniforms? I rather suspect this distinction would not have been made anyway in the case of the Republican Guard, but the question is still there. It is within the law for a state's military to fight rebels with military force. When the rebels come from a local population, however, and do not distinguish themselves from that population, how can the state's army avoid committing war crimes?
A specific instance of the soldiers obeying a norm that is not codified in international law was protecting civilian IDPs to get them to the Iranian border. IHL is ambigious when it comes to IDPs, and so there was no legal obligation for the Americans to protect them. This is especially significant in regards to the fact that in escorting the IDPs to the border, the Americans were directly violating international law by violating a treaty signed between the United States and Iraq.
An article off of AOL news
http://news.aol.com/story/_a/gen-butt-naked-confesses-to-killings/20080121080609990002?ncid=NWS00010000000001
Some of the information in this article goes beyond regular horrifying to just plainly bizarre. I am disturbed that people who are not only ill-educated but also obviously crazy can play such a significant role in history.
Some of the information in this article goes beyond regular horrifying to just plainly bizarre. I am disturbed that people who are not only ill-educated but also obviously crazy can play such a significant role in history.
Tuesday, January 15, 2008
The Ehren Watada case
I honestly have mixed feelings about this particular case.
To start with, I am annoyed with the article itself, which is extremely biased, and so it is hard to discern the actual facts. The fact that people were tortured and otherwise mistreated at Abu Ghraib has very little bearing on the legitimacy of the declaration of war, and therefore on the Watada case. While I realize that this is an opinion post, and that the author is always free to say what they think, I am usually bothered by bias when it appears in the media.
Of course, that is neither here nor there. This blog is supposed to be about the case itself. On that topic, it seems that if one voluntarily joins the military, that person takes on the responsibility of being involved in conflicts he or she may not necessarily agree with. Watada was not conscripted, he enlisted voluntarily. Military discipline enshrines the principle that a soldier does what he or she is told, regardless of their feelings or opinions. A lack of discipline during war could have dire effects.
On the other hand, as the author of the article points out, the Nuremberg Principles established that officers have a duty to refuse unlawful orders. However, no one has, to my satisfaction, been able to prove either the legality or illegality of the Iraq War. Furthermore, I would argue that the Nuremberg Principles form part of jus in bello, rather than jus ad bellum. Soldiers are bound by the Nuremberg Principles to refuse to follow orders that are illegal during war, not to refuse to join war. People who refused the draft during the Vietnam War were imprisoned, however they may have felt about the legality of the war, because they did not have the ability to refuse to fight the war itself. Similarly, while Watada would have had an obligation to not only not participate, but to stop, the events that occurred at Abu Ghraib, he did not have the right to refuse to go to war.
So legally, it seems the United States military is behaving in an appropriate fashion in response to insubordination by an officer. However, it seems a tad petty that the military would not just reassign Watada to Afghanistan, where there are certainly not enough boots on the ground. I suppose one could make the argument that quite a lot of the soldiers in Iraq do not agree with the legality or morality of the war, and so allowing Watada to choose to go to Afghanistan could set an inconvenient precedent that would result in the war effort in Iraq being seriously hampered. However, none of those soldiers seemed to have been as resistant to the idea of the Iraq War. Perhaps a restriction of privileges in response to insubordination, followed by transfer to Afghanistan, would be more appropriate than a court martial in the Watada case.
Finally, it seems pretty obvious to me that a court martial would not permit anyone to use the illegal war defense. The President of the United States sent combat troops to another country. Therefore, the military, which is subordinate to the President, has to consider the war legal. If Watada were to win the case using the argument that the Iraq War is illegal, the results could be very serious, not least in terms of cases being brought against the United States for illegal aggression. What happens if the U.S. military refuses to obey the civilian government? That sounds an awful lot like the start of a coup. Additionally, courts martial do not operate according to the standard legal proceedings of the United States judicial system. Defendants in courts martial do not have the same rights as defendants in a normal criminal case. It seems rather unfair, but there it is. It is naive, at the very least, for the author to expect that standard rules of freedom of speech and basic criminal law apply in a court martial.
To start with, I am annoyed with the article itself, which is extremely biased, and so it is hard to discern the actual facts. The fact that people were tortured and otherwise mistreated at Abu Ghraib has very little bearing on the legitimacy of the declaration of war, and therefore on the Watada case. While I realize that this is an opinion post, and that the author is always free to say what they think, I am usually bothered by bias when it appears in the media.
Of course, that is neither here nor there. This blog is supposed to be about the case itself. On that topic, it seems that if one voluntarily joins the military, that person takes on the responsibility of being involved in conflicts he or she may not necessarily agree with. Watada was not conscripted, he enlisted voluntarily. Military discipline enshrines the principle that a soldier does what he or she is told, regardless of their feelings or opinions. A lack of discipline during war could have dire effects.
On the other hand, as the author of the article points out, the Nuremberg Principles established that officers have a duty to refuse unlawful orders. However, no one has, to my satisfaction, been able to prove either the legality or illegality of the Iraq War. Furthermore, I would argue that the Nuremberg Principles form part of jus in bello, rather than jus ad bellum. Soldiers are bound by the Nuremberg Principles to refuse to follow orders that are illegal during war, not to refuse to join war. People who refused the draft during the Vietnam War were imprisoned, however they may have felt about the legality of the war, because they did not have the ability to refuse to fight the war itself. Similarly, while Watada would have had an obligation to not only not participate, but to stop, the events that occurred at Abu Ghraib, he did not have the right to refuse to go to war.
So legally, it seems the United States military is behaving in an appropriate fashion in response to insubordination by an officer. However, it seems a tad petty that the military would not just reassign Watada to Afghanistan, where there are certainly not enough boots on the ground. I suppose one could make the argument that quite a lot of the soldiers in Iraq do not agree with the legality or morality of the war, and so allowing Watada to choose to go to Afghanistan could set an inconvenient precedent that would result in the war effort in Iraq being seriously hampered. However, none of those soldiers seemed to have been as resistant to the idea of the Iraq War. Perhaps a restriction of privileges in response to insubordination, followed by transfer to Afghanistan, would be more appropriate than a court martial in the Watada case.
Finally, it seems pretty obvious to me that a court martial would not permit anyone to use the illegal war defense. The President of the United States sent combat troops to another country. Therefore, the military, which is subordinate to the President, has to consider the war legal. If Watada were to win the case using the argument that the Iraq War is illegal, the results could be very serious, not least in terms of cases being brought against the United States for illegal aggression. What happens if the U.S. military refuses to obey the civilian government? That sounds an awful lot like the start of a coup. Additionally, courts martial do not operate according to the standard legal proceedings of the United States judicial system. Defendants in courts martial do not have the same rights as defendants in a normal criminal case. It seems rather unfair, but there it is. It is naive, at the very least, for the author to expect that standard rules of freedom of speech and basic criminal law apply in a court martial.
Thursday, January 10, 2008
The Weinberger Doctrine
While reading James Turner Johnson's Morality and Contemporary Warfare for class, I came across a mention of the Weinberger Doctrine, on page 22. Because I didn't know what it was, I did some research. In case anybody else was similarly ignorant, or just needs a refresher, I've included the doctrine below. I took it from PBS, and here's the link where I found it: http://pbs.gen.in/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/index.html#weinbergerdoctrine
The Weinberger Doctrine limiting the committment of American combat forces:
1. Either the United States' or its close allies' vital national interests had to be at risk;
2. The war had to be fought "wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning";
3. We should employ decisive force in the pursuit of clearly defined political and military objectives;
4. We must constantly reassess whether the use of force is necessary and appropriate;
5. There must be a "reasonable assurance" of Congressional and public support;
6. Force should be used only as a last resort.
Additionally, in case you were curious as to the source of this doctrine, it comes from a speech Weinberger made in 1984 to the National Press Club. PBS also has a transcript of the speech, the link to which I've included below.
http://pbs.gen.in/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/weinberger.html
The Weinberger Doctrine limiting the committment of American combat forces:
1. Either the United States' or its close allies' vital national interests had to be at risk;
2. The war had to be fought "wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning";
3. We should employ decisive force in the pursuit of clearly defined political and military objectives;
4. We must constantly reassess whether the use of force is necessary and appropriate;
5. There must be a "reasonable assurance" of Congressional and public support;
6. Force should be used only as a last resort.
Additionally, in case you were curious as to the source of this doctrine, it comes from a speech Weinberger made in 1984 to the National Press Club. PBS also has a transcript of the speech, the link to which I've included below.
http://pbs.gen.in/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/weinberger.html
Wednesday, January 9, 2008
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